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Abstract
We prove a new minimax theorem connecting the worst-case Bayesian regret and minimax regret
under finite-action partial monitoring with no assumptions on the space of signals or decisions of
the adversary. We then generalise the information-theoretic tools of Russo and Van Roy (2016) for
proving Bayesian regret bounds and combine them with the minimax theorem to derive minimax
regret bounds for various partial monitoring settings. The highlight is a clean analysis of ‘easy’
and ‘hard’ finite partial monitoring, with new regret bounds that are independent of arbitrarily large
game-dependent constants and eliminate the logarithmic dependence on the horizon for easy games
that appeared in earlier work. The power of the generalised machinery is further demonstrated by
proving that the minimax regret for k-armed adversarial bandits is at most
√
2kn, improving on
existing results by a factor of 2. Finally, we provide a simple analysis of the cops and robbers
game, also improving best known constants.
Keywords: Online learning, partial monitoring, minimax theorems, bandits.
1. Introduction
Partial monitoring is a generalisation of the multi-armed bandit framework with an interestingly
richer structure. In this paper we are concerned with the finite-action version. Let k be the number
of actions. A finite-action partial monitoring game is described by two functions, the loss function
L : [k] × X → [0, 1] and a signal function Φ : [k] × X → Σ, where [k] = {1, 2, . . . , k} and X
and Σ are topological spaces. At the start of the game the adversary secretly chooses a sequence
of outcomes (xt)nt=1 with xt ∈ X , where n is the horizon. The learner knows L, Φ and n and
sequentially chooses actions (At)nt=1 from [k]. In round t, after the learner chooses At they suffer
a loss of L(At, xt) and observe only Φ(At, xt) as a way of indirectly learning about the loss. A
policy pi is a function mapping action/signal sequences to probability distributions over actions (the
learner is allowed to randomise) and the regret of policy pi in environment x = (xt)nt=1 is
Rn(pi, x) = max
a∈[k]
E
[
n∑
t=1
L(At, xt)− L(a, xt)
]
,
where the expectation is taken with respect to the randomness in the learner’s choices which follow
pi. The minimax regret of a partial monitoring game is
R∗n = inf
pi∈Π
sup
x∈Xn
Rn(pi, x) ,
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where Π is the space of all policies. Our objective is to understand how the minimax regret depends
on the horizon n and the structure of L and Φ. Note, this is the oblivious setting because the adver-
sary chooses all the losses at the start of the game. Some classical examples of partial monitoring
games are given in Table 1 and Fig. 5 in the appendix.
Setting X Σ Φ(a,x) L(a,x)
Full information [0, 1]k [0, 1]k x xa
Bandit [0, 1]k [0, 1] xa xa
Cops and robbers [0, 1]k [0, 1]k−1 x1, . . . , xa−1, xa+1, . . . , xk xa
Finite partial monitoring [d] arbitrary arbitrary arbitrary
Table 1: Example environment classes. In the last row, d is a natural number.
Bayesian viewpoint Although our primary objective is to shed light on the minimax adversarial
regret, we establish our results by first proving uniform bounds on the Bayesian regret that hold for
any prior. Then a new minimax theorem demonstrates the existence of an algorithm with the same
minimax regret. While these methods are not constructive, we demonstrate that they lead to elegant
analysis of various partial monitoring problems, and better control of the constants in the bounds.
LetQ be a space of probability measures on X n with the Borel σ-algebra. The Bayesian regret
of a policy pi with respect to prior ν ∈ Q is
BRn(pi, ν) =
∫
Xn
Rn(pi, x)dν(x) .
The minimax Bayesian optimal regret is
BR∗n(Q) = sup
ν∈Q
inf
pi∈ΠM
BRn(pi, ν) ,
where ΠM is a space of policies so that x 7→ Rn(pi, x) is measurable, which we define formally in
Section 3. WhenQ is clear from the context, we write BR∗n in place of BR
∗
n(Q).
Contributions Our first contribution is to generalise the machinery developed by Russo and Van
Roy (2016, 2017) and Bubeck et al. (2015). In particular, we prove a minimax theorem for finite-
action partial monitoring games with no restriction on either the loss or the feedback function. The
theorem establishes that the Bayesian optimal regret and minimax regret are equal: BR∗n = R∗n.
Next, the information-theoretic machinery of Russo and Van Roy (2017) is generalised by replacing
the mutual information with an expected Bregman divergence. The power of the generalisation is
demonstrated by showing that R∗n ≤
√
2kn for k-armed adversarial bandits, which improves on the
best known bounds by a factor of 2. The rest of the paper is focussed on applying these ideas to
finite partial monitoring games. The results enormously simplify existing analysis by sidestepping
the complex localisation arguments. At the same time, our bounds for the class of ‘easy non-
degenerate’ games do not depend on arbitrarily large game-dependent constants, which was true of
all prior analysis. Finally, for a special class of bandits with graph feedback called cops and robbers,
we show that R∗n ≤
√
2n log(k), improving on prior work by a factor of 5/
√
2.
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2. Related work
Since partial monitoring is so generic, the related literature is vast, with most work focussing on
the full information setting (see Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006)) or the bandit setting (Bubeck and
Cesa-Bianchi (2012); Lattimore and Szepesva´ri (2019)). The information-theoretic machinery that
we build on was introduced by Russo and Van Roy (2016, 2017) in the context of minimizing the
Bayesian regret for stationary stochastic bandits (with varying structural assumptions). Bubeck et al.
(2015) noticed the results also applied to the ‘adversarial’ Bayesian setting and applied minimax the-
ory to prove worst-case bounds for convex bandits. Minimax theory has also been used to transfer
Bayesian regret bounds to adversarial bounds. For example, Abernethy et al. (2009) explores this in
the context of online convex optimisation in the full-information setting and Gravin et al. (2016) for
prediction with expert advice. The finite version of partial monitoring was introduced by Rustichini
(1999), who developed Hannan consistent algorithms. The main challenge since then has been char-
acterizing the dependence of the regret on the horizon in terms of the structure of the loss and signal
functions. It is now known that all games can be classified into one of exactly four types. Trivial and
hopeless, for which R∗n = 0 and R∗n = Ω(n) respectively. Between these extremes there are ‘easy’
games where R∗n = Θ(n1/2) and ‘hard’ games for which R∗n = Θ(n2/3). The classification result
is proven by piecing together upper and lower bounds from various papers (Cesa-Bianchi et al.,
2006; Foster and Rakhlin, 2012; Antos et al., 2013; Barto´k et al., 2014; Lattimore and Szepesva´ri,
2019). A caveat of the classification theorem is that the focus is entirely on the dependence of the
minimax regret on the horizon. The leading constant is game-dependent and poorly understood.
Existing bounds for easy games depend on a constant that can be arbitrarily large, even for fixed
d and k. One of the contributions of this paper is to resolve this issue. Another disadvantage of
the current partial monitoring literature, especially in the adversarial setting, is that the algorithms
and analysis tend to be rather complicated. Although our results only prove the existence of an
algorithm witnessing a claimed minimax bound, the Bayesian algorithm and analysis are intuitive
and natural. There is also a literature on stochastic partial monitoring, with early analysis by Barto´k
et al. (2011). A quite practical algorithm was proposed by Vanchinathan et al. (2014). The asymp-
totics have also been worked out (Komiyama et al., 2015). Although a frequentist regret bound in a
stochastic setting normally implies a Bayesian regret bound, in our Bayesian setup the environments
are not stationary, while all the algorithms for the stochastic case rely heavily that the distribution of
the adversary is stationary. Generalising these algorithms to the non-stationary case does not seem
straightforward. Finally, we should mention there is an alternative definition of the regret that is
less harsh on the learner. For trivial, easy and hard games it is the same, but for hopeless games the
regret captures the hopelessness of the task and measures the performance of the learner relative to
an achievable objective. We do not consider this definition here. Readers interested in this varia-
tion can consult the papers by Rustichini (1999); Mannor and Shimkin (2003); Perchet (2011) and
Mannor et al. (2014).
3. Notation and conventions
The maximum/supremum of the empty set is negative infinity. The standard basis vectors in Rd
are e1, . . . , ed. The column vector of all ones is 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1)>. The standard inner product is
〈·, ·〉. The ith coordinate of vector x ∈ Rd is xi. The (d − 1)-dimensional probability simplex is
∆d−1 = {x ∈ [0, 1]d : ‖x‖1 = 1}. The interior of a topological space Z is int(Z) and its boundary
is ∂Z. The relative entropy between probability measures µ and ν over the same measurable space
3
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is D (ν ||µ) = ∫ log( dνdµ)dν if ν  µ and D (ν ||µ) = ∞ otherwise, where log is the natural
logarithm. When X is a random variable with X ∈ [a, b] almost surely, then Pinsker’s inequality
combined with straightforward inequalities shows that∫
X(dµ− dν) ≤ (b− a) ‖µ− ν‖TV ≤ (b− a)
√
1
2
D (µ || ν) , (1)
where ‖µ− ν‖TV is the total variation distance. When ν  µ, the squared Hellinger distance can
be written as h(ν, µ)2 =
∫
(1 −√dν/dµ)2dµ. Given a measure P and jointly distributed random
elements X and Y we let PX denote the law of X and (unconventionally) we let PX|Y be the
conditional law of X given Y , which satisfies PX|Y (·) = P(X ∈ · |Y ). One can think of PX|Y as
a random probability measure over the range of X that depends on Y . In none of our analysis do
we rely on exotic spaces where such regular versions do not exist. When Y ∈ [k] is discrete we let
PX|Y=i denote P(X ∈ · |Y = i) for i ∈ [k]. With this notation the mutual information between
X and Y is I(X;Y ) = E[D(PX|Y ||PX)]. The domain of a convex function F : Rd → R ∪ {∞}
is dom(F ) = {x : F (x) < ∞}. The Bregman divergence with respect to convex/differentiable
F is DF : dom(F ) × dom(F ) → [0,∞]. For x, y ∈ dom(F ) this is defined by DF (x, y) =
F (x)−F (y)−∇x−yF (y), where∇vF (y) is the directional derivative of F in direction v at y. The
relative entropy between categorical distributions p, q ∈ ∆k−1 is the Bregman divergence between
p and q where F is the unnormalised negentropy: F (p) =
∑k
i=1(pi log(pi) − pi) with domain
[0,∞)k. The diameter of a convex set K with respect to F is diamF (K) = supx,y∈K F (x)−F (y).
Probability spaces, policies and environments The Borel σ-algebra on topological space Z is
B(Z). Recall that X and Σ are assumed to carry a topology, which we will use for ensuring
measurability of the regret. More about the choices of these topologies later. We assume the signal
function Φ(a, ·) is B(X )/B(Σ)-measurable and the loss function L(a, ·) is B(X )-measurable. A
policy is a function pi : ∪nt=1([k] × Σ)t−1 → ∆k−1 and the space of all policies is Π. A policy is
measurable if ht−1 7→ pi(ht−1) is B(([k]× Σ)t)-measurable for all ht−1 = a1, σ1, . . . , at−1, σt−1,
which coincides with the usual definition of a probability kernel. The space of all measurable
policies is ΠM. In general ΠM is a strict subset of Π. For most of the paper we work in the Bayesian
framework where there is a prior probability measure ν on (X n,B(X n)). Given a prior ν and a
measurable policy pi ∈ ΠM, random elements X ∈ X n and A ∈ [k]n are defined on common
probability space (Ω,F ,P). We let Φt(a) = Φ(a,Xt) and Lt(a) = L(a,Xt). Expectations E are
with respect to P. For t ∈ [n+ 1] we let Ft = σ(A1,Φ(A1, X1), . . . , At−1,Φ(At−1, Xt−1)) ⊆ F ,
Et[·] = E[· | Ft] and Pt(·) = P(· | Ft). Note that F1 = {∅,Ω} is the trivial σ algebra. The σ-algebra
F and the measure P are such that
1. The law of the adversaries choices satisfies P(X ∈ · ) = ν(·).
2. For any t ∈ [n], the law of the actions almost surely satisfies
Pt(At ∈ · ) = Pt(At ∈ · |X) = pi(A1,Φ1(A1), . . . , At−1,Φt−1(At−1))(·) . (2)
The existence of a probability space satisfying these properties is guaranteed by Ionescu-Tulcea
(Kallenberg, 2002, Theorem 6.17). The last condition captures the important assumption that, con-
ditioned on the observed history, At is sampled independently from X . In particular, it implies that
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Xt and At are independent under Pt. The optimal action is A∗ = arg mina∈[k]
∑n
t=1 Lt(a). It is
not hard to see that the Bayesian regret is well defined and satisfies
BRn(pi, ν) = E
[
n∑
t=1
Lt(At)− Lt(A∗)
]
= E
[
n∑
t=1
∆t
]
,
where ∆t = Lt(At) − Lt(A∗). To minimise clutter, when the policy pi and prior ν are clear from
the context, we abbreviate BRn(pi, ν) to BRn. We let Pta = Pt(At = a), which means that
Pt ∈ ∆k−1 is a probability vector.
4. Minimax theorem
Our first main result is a theorem that connects the minimax regret to the worst-case Bayesian regret
over all finitely supported priors. The regret Rn(pi, x) is well defined for any x and any policy
pi ∈ Π, but the Bayesian regret depends on measurability of x 7→ Rn(pi, x). If ν is supported on a
finite set x1, . . . , xm ∈ X n, however, we can write
BRn(pi, ν) =
m∑
i=1
ν({xi})Rn(pi, xi) ,
which does not rely on measurability. By considering finitely supported priors we free ourselves
from any concern that x 7→ Rn(pi, x) might not be measurable. This also means that if Σ (or X )
came with some topologies, we simply replace them with the discrete topology (which makes all
maps continuous and measurable, implying Π = ΠM).
Theorem 1 LetQ be the space of all finitely supported probability measures on X n. Then
inf
pi∈Π
sup
x∈Xn
Rn(pi, x) = sup
ν∈Q
min
pi∈Π
BRn(pi, ν) .
An equivalent statement of this theorem is that if X and Σ carry the discrete topology then R∗n =
BR∗n(Q), which is the form we prove in Appendix A. The strength of this result is that it depends
on no assumptions except that the action set is finite.
Our proof borrows techniques from a related result by Bubeck et al. (2015). The main idea
is to replace the policy space Π with a simpler space of ‘mixtures’ over deterministic policies,
which is related to Kuhn’s celebrated result on the equivalence of behavioral and mixed strategies
(Kuhn, 1953). We then establish that this space is compact and use Sion’s theorem to exchange the
minimum and maximum. While we borrowed the ideas from Bubeck et al. (2015), our proof relies
heavily on the finiteness of the action space, which allowed us to avoid any assumptions on Σ and
X , which also necessitated our choice ofQ. Neither of the two results imply each other.
Theorem 1 is a minimax theorem for a special kind of two-player multistage zero-sum determin-
istic partial information game. Minimax theorems for this case are nontrivial because of challenges
related to measurability and the use of Sion’s theorem. Although there is a rich and sophisticated
literature on this topic, we are not aware of any result implying our theorem. Tools include the
approach we took using the weak topology (Bernhard, 1992), or the so-called weak-strong topology
(Leao et al., 2000) and reduction to completely observable games and then using dynamic program-
ming (Ghosh et al., 2004). An interesting challenge is to extend our result to compact action spaces.
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One may hope to generalise the proof by Bubeck et al. (2015), but some important details are miss-
ing (for example, the measurable space on which the priors live is undefined, the measurability of
the regret is unclear as is the compactness of distributions induced by measurable policies). We
believe that the approach of Ghosh et al. (2004) can complete this result.
5. The regret information tradeoff
Unless otherwise mentioned, all expectations E are with respect to the probability measure over
interactions between a fixed policy pi ∈ ΠM and an environment sampled from a prior ν on
(X n,B(X n)). Before our generalisation we present a restatement of the core theorem in the analy-
sis by Russo and Van Roy (2016). Let It(X;Y ) be the mutual information between X and Y under
Pt. Although the proof is identical, the setup here is different because the prior ν is arbitrary.
Theorem 2 (Russo and Van Roy (2016)) Suppose there exists a constant β ≥ 0 such thatEt[∆t] ≤√
βIt(A∗; Φt(At), At) almost surely for all t. Then BRn ≤
√
nβ log(k).
This elegant result provides a bound on the regret in terms of the information gain about the op-
timal arm. Our generalisation replaces the information gain with an expected Bregman divergence.
Theorem 3 Let (Mt)n+1t=1 be an Rd-valued martingale adapted to (Ft)n+1t=1 and Mt ∈ D ⊂ Rd
almost surely for all t. Then let F be a convex function with diamF (D) < ∞. Suppose there exist
constants α, β ≥ 0 such that Et[∆t] ≤ α +
√
βEt[DF (Mt+1,Mt)] almost surely for all t. Then
BRn ≤ αn+
√
nβ diamF (D).
Proof We calculate
Et[DF (Mt+1,Mt)] = Et
[
lim inf
h→0+
(
F (Mt+1)− F (Mt)− F (Mt + h(Mt+1 −Mt))− F (Mt)
h
)]
≤ lim inf
h→0+
(
Et
[
F (Mt+1)− F (Mt)− F ((1− h)Mt + hMt+1)− F (Mt)
h
])
= Et [F (Mt+1)]− F (Mt) + lim inf
h→0+
F (Mt)− Et[F ((1− h)Mt + hMt+1)]
h
≤ Et [F (Mt+1)]− F (Mt) + lim inf
h→0+
F (Mt)− F (Et[(1− h)Mt + hMt+1])
h
= Et [F (Mt+1)]− F (Mt) , (3)
where the first inequality follows from Fatou’s lemma and the second from convexity of F . The last
equality is because Et[Mt+1] = Mt. Hence
BRn = E
[
n∑
t=1
∆t
]
≤ αn+ E
[
n∑
t=1
√
βEt[DF (Mt+1,Mt)]
]
≤ αn+
√√√√βnE[ n∑
t=1
Et[DF (Mt+1,Mt)]
]
≤ αn+
√
βndiamF (D) ,
where the first inequality follows from the assumption in the theorem, the second by Cauchy-
Schwarz, while the third follows by Eq. (3), telescoping and the definition of the diameter.
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A natural choice for Mt is the posterior distribution of the optimal action. Let P ∗ta = Pt(A∗ =
a), which is the posterior probability that A∗ = a based on the information available at the start
of round t. By the tower rule, we have Et[P ∗t+1] = P ∗t so that (P ∗t )
n+1
t=1 is a martingale adapted to
(Ft)n+1t=1 .
Corollary 4 Let F : Rk → R be a convex function with diamF (∆k−1) <∞. Suppose there exist
constants α, β ≥ 0 such that Et[∆t] ≤ α +
√
βEt[DF (P ∗t+1, P ∗t )] almost surely for all t. Then
BRn ≤ αn+
√
nβ diamF (∆k−1).
Remark 5 That Theorem 3 generalises Theorem 2 follows by choosing F as the unnormalised
negentropy for which diamF (∆k−1) ≤ log(k) and Et[DF (P ∗t+1, P ∗t )] = It(A∗; Φt(At), At). The
assumption that Mt ∈ Rd can be relaxed. The result continues to hold when Mt takes values in a
bounded subset of a Banach space, where the martingale is defined using the Bochner integral. The
Bregman divergence generalises naturally via the Gateoux derivative.
6. Finite-armed bandits
In the bandit setting the learner observes the loss of the action they play, which is modelled by
choosing Σ = [0, 1], X = [0, 1]k and Φ(a, x) = L(a, x) = xa. The best known bound is by
Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi (2012), who prove that online mirror descent with an appropriate potential
satisfies R∗n ≤
√
8kn. Using the same potential in combination with Theorem 3 allows us to
improve this result to R∗n ≤
√
2kn.
Theorem 6 The minimax regret for k-armed adversarial bandits satisfies R∗n ≤
√
2kn.
Proof LetF (p) = −2∑ka=1√pa, which has domain [0,∞)k and diamF (∆k−1) ≤ 2√k. Combine
Corollary 4 and Theorem 1 and Lemma 7 below for Thompson sampling, which is the policy that
samples At from Pt = P ∗t .
Lemma 7 Let F be as above and Pt = P ∗t . Then Et[∆t] ≤
√
k1/2Et[DF (P ∗t+1, P ∗t )] a.s..
Remark 8 Potentials other than the negentropy have been used in many applications in bandits
and online convex optimisation. The log barrier, for example, leads to first order bounds for k-
armed bandits (Wei and Luo, 2018). Alternative potentials also appear in the context of adversarial
linear bandits (Bubeck et al., 2012, 2018) and follow the perturbed leader (Abernethy et al., 2014).
Investigating the extent to which these applications transfer to the Bayesian setting is an interesting
direction for the future.
7. Finite partial monitoring games
Recall from Table 1 that a finite partial monitoring game is characterised by functions L : [k] ×
[d] → [0, 1] and Φ : [k] × [d] → Σ where d is a natural number and Σ is arbitrary. Finite partial
monitoring enjoys a rich linear structure, which we now summarise. A picture can help absorbing
these concepts, and is provided with an example at the beginning of Appendix I. For a ∈ [k],
let `a ∈ [0, 1]d be the vector with `ax = L(a, x). Actions a and b are duplicates if `a = `b.
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The cell associated with action a is Ca = {u ∈ ∆d−1 : 〈`a, u〉 ≤ minb 6=a〈`b, u〉}, which is the
subset of distributions u ∈ ∆d−1 where action a minimises Ex∼u[L(a, x)]. Note that Ca ⊂ Rd
is a closed convex polytope and its dimension dim(Ca) is defined as the dimension of the affine
space it generates. An action a is called Pareto optimal if Ca has dimension d − 1 and degenerate
otherwise. Of course ∪aCa = ∆d−1, but cells may have nonempty intersection. When a and b are
not duplicates, the intersection Ca ∩ Cb is a (possibly empty) polytope of dimension at most d− 2.
A pair of Pareto optimal actions a and b are called neighbours if Ca ∩ Cb has dimension d − 2. A
game is called non-degenerate if there are no degenerate actions and no duplicate actions. So far
none of the concepts have depended on the signal function. Local observability is a property of the
signal and loss functions that allows the learner to estimate loss differences between actions a and
b by playing only those actions. For neighbours a and b let Nab = {c : Cc ⊆ Ca ∩ Cb}, which
contains a and its duplicates, b and its duplicates, and degenerate actions c with Cc = Ca ∩ Cb. A
game is globally observable if for all pairs of neighbours there exists a function f : [k] × Σ → R
such that
L(a, x)− L(b, x) =
k∑
c=1
f(c,Φ(c, x)) . (4)
The game is locally observable if for all pairs of neighbours a and b the function f can be chosen
satisfying Eq. (4) and additionally that f(c,Φ(c, x)) = 0 for all c /∈ Nab. In the standard analysis
of partial monitoring the function f is used to derive importance-weighted estimators of the loss
differences. In the following f is used more directly. A quantity that appears naturally in the
analysis is the supremum norm of the estimation functions f . Given a globally observable game,
we let v ≥ 0 be the smallest value such that for all pairs of neighbours a and b there exists a function
satisfying Eq. (4) with ‖f‖∞ ≤ v. For locally observable games v is defined in the same way, but
with the additional restriction that f is supported on Nab. The neighbourhood of a is Na = {b :
dim(Ca∩Cb) ≥ d−2}. The neighbourhood graph over [k] has edges {(a, b) : a, b are neighbours}.
For non-degenerate games, the neighbourhood graph is connected.
The following theorem classifies all partial monitoring games into one of four categories. All
results were known previously except that previous upper bounds for locally observable games were
R∗n = O((n log(n))1/2).
Theorem 9 The minimax regret for finite partial monitoring game G satisfies the following:
R∗n =

0 if there are no neighbouring actions
Θ(n1/2) if there are neighbouring actions and G is locally observable
Θ(n2/3) if G is globally observable and not locally observable
Ω(n) otherwise .
Summary of new results The main theorem is the following, which improves on previous bounds
that all depend on arbitrarily large game-dependent constants, even when k and d are fixed.
Theorem 10 For any locally observable non-degenerate game: R∗n ≤ k3/2(d+ 1)
√
8n log(k).
For degenerate locally observable games the bound differs only due to the increased norm of the
estimation functions. In particular, we have the following theorem, which improves on prior work
in terms of constants and logarithmic factors (Lattimore and Szepesva´ri, 2019).
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Theorem 11 For any locally observable game: R∗n ≤ vk3/2
√
8n log(k), where v is a bound on
the supremum norm of the estimation functions.
The bound for globally observable games has the same order as the prior work, but with slightly
improved constants (Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2006).
Theorem 12 For any globally observable game: R∗n ≤ 3(nkv)2/3(log(k)/2)1/3, where v is a
bound on the supremum norm of the estimation functions.
Finally, for any locally/globally observable game, Lemma 25 in the appendix shows that the
norm of the estimators is bounded by at most v ≤ d1/2(1 + k)d/2, which provides an explicit upper
bound that is independent of the loss and signal matrix. We believe the exponential dependence on
the dimension is unavoidable in general.
8. Proof of Theorem 10
For this section we assume the game is non-degenerate and locally observable. Before the proof
of Theorem 10 we provide the algorithm, which seems to be novel among previous algorithms for
partial monitoring. Note that Thompson sampling can suffer linear regret in partial monitoring (Ap-
pendix G). LetGt = arg mina∈[k] Et[Lt(a)] be the greedy action that minimises the 1-step Bayesian
expected loss. The idea is to define a directed tree with vertex set [k] and rootGt and where all paths
lead to Gt. A little notation is needed. Define an undirected graph with vertices Vt and edges Et by
Vt = {a ∈ [k] : Et[Lt(a)] = Et[Lt(Gt)]} and Et = {a, b ∈ Vt : a and b are neighbours}, which is
connected by Lemma 23. Note that Vt = {Gt} when Gt is unique, but this is not always the case.
For a ∈ Vt let ρt(a) be the length of the shortest path from a to Gt in (Vt, Et) with ρt(Gt) = 0 by
definition. Let Pt : [k]→ [k] be the ‘parent’ function:
Pt(a) =
{
arg minb∈Na Et[Lt(b)] if a /∈ Vt
arg minb∈Na∩Vt ρt(b) otherwise .
The following lemma is proven in Appendix H.
Lemma 13 The directed graph over vertex set [k] with an edge from a to b if a 6= Gt and b = P(a)
is a directed tree with root Gt.
Let At(a) be the set of ancestors of action a in the tree defined in Lemma 13. We adopt the
convention that a ∈ At(a). By the previous lemma, Gt ∈ At(a) for all a. Let Dt(a) be the set
of descendants of a, which does not include a (Fig. 7). The depth of an action a in round t is the
distance between a and the root Gt. An action a is called anomalous for P ∈ ∆k−1 in round t if
Pa < maxb∈Dt(a) Pb. Algorithm 2 defines the ‘water transfer’ operator Wt : ∆
k−1 → ∆k−1 that
corrects this deficiency by transferring mass towards the root of the tree defined in Lemma 13 while
ensuring that (a) the loss suffered when playing the according to the transformed distribution does
not increase and (b) the distribution is not changed too much. The process is illustrated in Fig. 1 in
Appendix F, where you will also find the proof of the next lemma.
Lemma 14 Let P ∈ ∆k−1 and Q = W kt P = Wt · · ·WtP . Then:
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1.
∑k
a=1QaEt[Lt(a)] ≤
∑k
a=1 PaEt[Lt(a)].
2. Qa ≤ QPt(a) for all a ∈ [k].
3. Qa ≥ Pa/k for all a ∈ [k].
Our new algorithm samplesAt from Pt = W kt P
∗
t . Because of the plumbing and randomisation,
the new algorithm is called Mario sampling (Algorithm 1). The proof of Theorem 10 follows
immediately from Theorems 1 and 2 and the following lemma.
input: partial monitoring game (Σ,L,Φ) and prior ν
for t = 1, . . . , n
compute P ∗t and Pt = W kt P ∗t . Then sample At ∼ Pt.
Algorithm 1: Mario sampling
Lemma 15 For Mario sampling: Et[∆t] ≤ (d+ 1)k3/2
√
8It(A∗; Φt(At), At) a.s..
Proof We assume an appropriate zero measure set is discarded so that we can omit the qualification
‘almost surely’ for the rest of the proof. By the first part of Lemma 14,
Et[∆t] ≤
k∑
a=1
P ∗ta (Et[Lt(a)]− Et[Lt(a) |A∗ = a]) . (5)
For b 6= Gt let fb, gb : Σ → R be a pair of functions such that max{‖fb‖∞ , ‖gb‖∞} ≤ d + 1
and fb(Φ(b, x)) + gb(Φ(Pt(b), x)) = L(b, x) − L(Pt(b), x) for all x ∈ [d]. The existence of such
functions is guaranteed by Lemma 24 and the fact that Pt(b) ∈ N (b) and because we assumed the
game is non-degenerate, locally observable. The expected loss of a can be decomposed in terms of
the sum of differences to the root,
Et[Lt(a)] = Et
Lt(Gt) + ∑
b∈At(a)\{Gt}
(Lt(b)− Lt(Pt(b)))

= Et
Lt(Gt) + ∑
b∈At(a)\{Gt}
fb(Φt(b)) + gb(Φt(Pt(b)))
 . (6)
In the same way,
Et[Lt(a) |A∗ = a] = Et
Lt(Gt) + ∑
b∈At(a)\{Gt}
fb(Φt(b)) + gb(Φt(Pt(b)))
∣∣∣∣∣∣A∗ = a
 . (7)
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Then, because At(a) and Gt are Ft-measurable,
Et[∆t] ≤
k∑
a=1
P ∗ta (Et[Lt(a)]− Et[Lt(a) |A∗ = a]) (Eq. (5))
=
k∑
a=1
P ∗ta
[ ∑
b∈At(a)\{Gt}
(Et[fb(Φt(b))]− Et[fb(Φt(b)) |A∗ = a])
+
∑
b∈At(a)\{Gt}
(Et[gb(Φt(Pt(b)))]− Et[gb(Φt(Pt(b))) |A∗ = a])
]
(Eqs. (6) and (7))
≤ (d+ 1)
k∑
a=1
P ∗ta
∑
b∈At(a)
√
8 D
(
Pt,Φt(b)|A∗=a
∣∣∣∣Pt,Φt(b)) (Eq. (1), D ≥ 0)
≤ k(d+ 1)
√√√√8 k∑
a=1
P ∗ta
∑
b∈At(a)
P ∗ta D
(
Pt,Φt(b)|A∗=a
∣∣∣∣Pt,Φt(b)) (Cauchy-Schwarz)
≤ k3/2(d+ 1)
√√√√8 k∑
a=1
P ∗ta
∑
b∈At(a)
Ptb D
(
Pt,Φt(b)|A∗=a
∣∣∣∣Pt,Φt(b)) (Lemma 14, Part 3)
≤ k3/2(d+ 1)
√√√√8 k∑
a=1
P ∗ta
k∑
b=1
Ptb D
(
Pt,Φt(b)|A∗=a
∣∣∣∣Pt,Φt(b)) (D ≥ 0)
= k3/2(d+ 1)
√
8It(A∗; Φt(At), At) . (Lemma 26)
Remark 16 In many games there exists a constant m such that |At(a)| ≤ m almost surely for
all a and t. In this case Part 3 of Lemma 14 improves to Pta ≥ P ∗ta/m and the application of
Cauchy-Schwarz in Lemma 15 can be strengthened. This means the bound in Theorem 10 becomes
m(d + 1)
√
8kn log(k). For the game illustrated in Fig. 7, m = 5 while k = 7, but more extreme
examples are easily constructed.
9. Discussion and future directions
One of the main benefits of the information-theoretic approach is the simplicity and naturality of the
arguments, which is particularly striking in partial monitoring. Even for the k-armed bandit analysis
there is no tuning of learning rates or careful bounding of dual norms. In exchange, our results
are existential, though we emphasise that the Bayesian setting is interesting in its own right. We
anticipate that Theorem 3 will have many other applications and there is clearly more to understand
about this generalisation. Is it a coincidence that the same potential leads to minimax bounds using
both online stochastic mirror descent and Thompson sampling?
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input: P ∈ ∆k−1 and tree determined by Pt
find action a at the greatest depth such that Pa < maxb∈Dt(a) Pb.
if no such action is found, let WtP = P and return.
for α ∈ [0, 1] let Dt(a;α) = {b ∈ Dt(a) : Pb ≥ α}.
let α∗ be the largest α ∈ {Pb : b ∈ Dt(a)} such that
pα =
1
1 + |Dt(a;α)|
∑
b∈Dt(a;α)∪{a}
Pb > qα = max{Pb : b ∈ Dt(a) \ Dt(a;α)} .
let (WtP )b = pα∗ if b ∈ Dt(a;α∗) ∪ {a} and (WtP )b = Pb otherwise.
Algorithm 2: The water transfer operator Wt : ∆k−1 → ∆k−1.
Information-directed sampling Thompson sampling depends on the prior, but not the potential
that appears in Theorem 3. Russo and Van Roy (2014) noted that the information-theoretic analysis
is tightest when the algorithm is chosen to minimize Et[∆t]2/Et[DF (P ∗t+1, P ∗t )], where F is the
unnormalised negentropy. Our generalisation provides a means of constructing new algorithms by
changing the potential.
Open problems An obvious next step is stress test the applicability of Theorem 3. Bandits with
graph feedback beyond cops and robbers might be a good place to start (Alon et al., 2015). One may
also ask whether in adversarial linear bandits the results by Bubeck et al. (2018) can be replicated
or improved using Theorem 3. There are many open problems in partial monitoring, a few of which
we now describe. We hope some readers will be inspired to work on them!
Adaptivity There exist games where for ‘nice’ adversaries the regret should be O(n1/2) while for
truly adversarial data the regret is as large as Θ(n2/3). Designing algorithms that adapt to a broad
range of adversaries is an interesting challenge. Some work on this topic in the stochastic setting
is by Barto´k et al. (2012). A related question is understanding how to use the information-theoretic
machinery to provide adaptive bounds.
Constants Our results have eliminated arbitrarily large constants from the analysis of easy non-
degenerate games. Still, we do not yet understand how the regret should depend on the structure of
L or Φ except in special cases. The result in Remark 16 is a small step in this direction, but there is
much to do. The best place to start is probably lower bounds. Currently generic lower bounds for
finite partial monitoring focus on the dependence on the horizon. One concrete question is whether
or not the minimum supremum norm of the estimation functions that appears in Theorem 12 is a
fundamental quantity.
Stochastic analysis of Mario sampling Theorem 2 and Lemma 15 show that for any prior Mario
sampling satisfies BRn ≤ k3/2(d + 1)
√
8n log(k). In the stationary stochastic setting we expect
that for a suitable prior it should be possible to prove a bound on the frequentist regret of this
algorithm. Perhaps the techniques developed by Agrawal and Goyal (2013) or Kaufmann et al.
(2012) generalise to this setting.
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1
The proof depends on a little functional analysis. The important point is that the space of policies
written as probability measures over deterministic policies is compact and the Bayesian regret is
linear and continuous as a function of the measures over policies and priors over environments.
Then minimax theorems can be used to exchange the min and sup. Guaranteeing compactness and
continuity and avoiding any kind of measurability issues requires careful choice of topologies.
For a topological space Z, let Pr(Z) be the space of Radon probability measures when Z is
equipped with the Borel σ-algebra. The weak* topology on Pr(Z) is the coarsest topology such
that µ 7→ ∫ fdµ is continuous for all bounded continuous functions f : Z → R.
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Recall that X is the space of outcomes and Σ is the space of feedbacks and these are arbitrary
sets. A deterministic policy can be represented as a function pi : ∪nt=1Σt−1 → [k]. By the choice
of topology on Σ, these are all continuous, hence, measurable. Let ΠD be the space of all such
policies, ΠDM be the space of the measurable policies amongst these. By Tychonoff’s theorem,
ΠD is compact with the product topology, where [k] has the discrete topology. ΠD is Hausdorff
because the product of Hausdorff spaces is Hausdorff. By Theorem 8.9.3 in the two volume book
by Bogachev (2007), the spacePr(ΠD) is weak*-compact. ClearlyPr(ΠD) is also convex.
LetQ be the space of finitely supported probability measures onX n, which is a convex subset of
Pr(X n) where X n is taken to have the discrete topology. Equip withQ with the weak* topology.
If f = f(µ, ν) with f : Pr(ΠD) ×Q → R is linear and continuous in both µ and ν individually.
SincePr(ΠD) is compact, by Sion’s minimax theorem (Sion, 1958),1
min
µ∈Pr(ΠD)
sup
ν∈Q
f(µ, ν) = sup
ν∈Q
min
µ∈Pr(ΠD)
f(µ, ν) .
We are going to choose f to be the Bayesian regret and argue that Π can be identified withPr(ΠD).
First, we need to check some continuity conditions for the regret. SinceX n has the discrete topology
the map x 7→ Rn(pi, x) is continuous for fixed pi. Now we check that pi 7→ Rn(pi, x), pi ∈ ΠD, is
continuous for fixed x. Let Φt(a) = Φ(a, xt) and Lt(a) = L(a, xt), which are both continuous
since [k] has the discrete topology. Then let σt : ΠD → Σ and at : ΠD → [k] be defined inductively
by
at(pi) = pi(σ1(pi), . . . , σt−1(pi)) and σt(pi) = Φt(at(pi)) .
Writing the definition of the regret,
Rn(pi, x) =
n∑
t=1
Lt(at(pi))− min
a∈[k]
n∑
t=1
Lt(a) .
The second term is constant and, as we mentioned already, a 7→ Lt(a) is continuous. So it remains
to check that at is continuous for each t. This follows by induction. The definition of the product
topology means that for any fixed σ1, . . . , σt−1 and b ∈ [k], the set
Ub(σ1, . . . , σt−1) = {pi : pi(σ1, . . . , σt−1) = b}
is open in ΠD. Let  denote the empty tuple. Then a−11 (b) = Ub() is open in ΠD. We confirm that
a2 is continuous and leave the rest to the reader. That a2 is continuous follows by writing
a−12 (c) =
k⋃
b=1
(Ub() ∩ Uc(Φ1(b))) .
Hence pi 7→ Rn(pi, x) is continuous and also measurable with respect to the Borel σ-algebra on ΠD.
Then let f(µ, ν) be given by
f(µ, ν) =
∫
ΠD
∫
Xn
Rn(pi, x)dν(x)dµ(pi) =
∫
Xn
∫
ΠD
Rn(pi, x)dµ(pi)dν(x) ,
1. Sion’s theorem is more general, it only assumes that f is quasiconvex/quasiconcave in each argument and upper/lower
semicontinuous respectively.
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where the exchange of integrals is justified by Fubini’s theorem, which is applicable because the
regret is bounded in [−n, n]. Clearly f is linear in both arguments. We now claim that both
µ 7→ f(µ, ν) and ν 7→ f(µ, ν) are continuous. To see that ν 7→ f(µ, ν) is continuous, note
that x 7→ ∫ΠD dµ(pi)Rn(pi, x) is a X n → [−n, n] continuous map owning to the choice of the dis-
crete topology on X n. Since Q ⊂ Pr(X n) is equipped with the weak*-topology, this implies the
continuity of ν 7→ f(µ, ν). The argument for the continuity of µ 7→ f(µ, ν) is similar: In particular,
first note that pi 7→ ∫Xn dν(x)Rn(pi, x) is a ΠD → [−n, n] continuous map, since owning to the
choice of Q, the integral with respect to ν is a finite sum, and we have already established that
for x ∈ X n fixed, pi 7→ Rn(pi, x) is a ΠD → [−n, n] continuous map. Again, the choice of the
weak*-topology onPr(ΠD) implies the desired continuity.
The final step is to note that for each policy µ ∈Pr(ΠD) there exists a policy pi ∈ Π such that
for all x ∈ X n,
Rn(pi, x) =
∫
ΠD
Rn(pid, x)dµ(pid) .
In particular, it is not hard to show that pi can be defined through pi(a1, φ(a1, x), . . . , at, φ(at, x))a =
Pµ,x(At+1 = a|A1 = a1, . . . , At = at), where Pµ,x is the distribution resulting from using µ on the
environment x. Here, the right-hand side is well defined (as a completely regular measure) because
of the choice ofA. That pi is well defined and is suitable follows from the definitions. Putting things
together,
R∗n = inf
pi∈Π
sup
x∈Xn
Rn(pi, x) ≤ min
µ∈Pr(ΠD)
sup
x∈Xn
∫
ΠD
Rn(pi, x)dµ(pi)
(a)
≤ min
µ∈Pr(ΠD)
sup
ν∈Q
f(µ, ν)
(b)
= sup
ν∈Q
min
µ∈Pr(ΠD)
f(µ, ν)
(c)
= sup
ν∈Q
min
pi∈ΠD
∫
Xn
Rn(pi, x)dν(x)
(d)
= sup
ν∈Q
min
pi∈Π
∫
Xn
Rn(pi, x)dν(x)
(e)
= BR∗n(Q) , (8)
where in (a) we used the fact that the Dirac measures are inQ, (b) follows from Sion’s theorem. In
(c) we used the fact that the Dirac measures inPr(ΠD) are minimisers of f(·, ν) for any ν, in (d) we
used that ΠD ⊂ Π and, via a dynamic programming argument, that the deterministic policies from
ΠD minimise the Bayesian regret. For (e), let Ppiν be the joint induced by pi and ν over [k]n × X n,
Epiν the corresponding expectation and define rn(a, x) =
∑n
t=1 L(at, xt)−minb∈[k]
∑n
t=1 L(b, xt).
Then, note that Ppiν almost surely, Epiν [rn(A,X)|X] = Rn(pi,X), and thus, by the tower rule and
because Ppiν,X = ν by assumption,
∫
Xn Rn(pi, x)dν(x) = BRn(pi, ν). That BR
∗
n(Q) ≤ R∗n
follows from
R∗n = inf
pi∈Π
sup
x∈Xn
Rn(pi, x) = inf
pi∈Π
sup
ν∈Q
∫
Xn
Rn(pi, x)dν(x) ≥ sup
ν∈Q
inf
pi∈Π
∫
Xn
Rn(pi, x)dν(x)
= BR∗n(Q) , (9)
where the second equality used that for any fixed pi ∈ Π, ν 7→ ∫Xn Rn(pi, x)dν(x) is a linear
functional on Pr(X n), which is thus maximised in the extreme points of Pr(X n), which are all
the Dirac measures over X n. Combining Eqs. (8) and (9) gives the desired result.
17
AN INFORMATION-THEORETIC APPROACH TO MINIMAX REGRET IN PARTIAL MONITORING
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 7
Using the fact that the total variation distance is upper bounded by the Hellinger distance (Tsybakov,
2008, Lemma 2.3) and the first inequality in Eq. (1),
Et[∆t] =
∑
a:P ∗ta>0
P ∗ta (Et[Xta]− Et[Xta |A∗ = a])
≤
∑
a:P ∗ta>0
P ∗ta
√√√√∫
[0,1]
(
1−
√
dPt,Xta|A∗=a
dPt,Xta
)2
dPt,Xta (10)
≤
√√√√√k1/2 ∑
a:P ∗ta>0
(P ∗ta)3/2
∫
[0,1]
(
1−
√
dPt,Xta|A∗=a
dPt,Xta
)2
dPt,Xta . (11)
Eq. (10) is true because the total variation distance is upper bounded by the Hellinger distance.
Eq. (11) uses Cauchy-Schwarz and the fact that
∑k
a=1(P
∗
ta)
1/2 ≤ k1/2, which also follows from
Cauchy-Schwarz. The next step is to apply Bayes law to the square root term. There are no measur-
ability problems because both Xta and A∗ live in Polish spaces (Ghosal and van der Vaart, 2017).∫
[0,1]
(
1−
√
dPt,Xta|A∗=a
dPt,Xta
)2
dPt,Xta =
∫
[0,1]
(
1−
√
Pt(A∗ = a |Xta)(x)
Pt(A∗ = a)
)2
dPt,Xta(x)
= Et
(1−√Pt(A∗ = a |Xta)
Pt(A∗ = a)
)2
=
1√
Pt(A∗ = a)
Et

(√
Pt(A∗ = a)−
√
Pt(A∗ = a |Xta)
)2
√
Pt(A∗ = a)
 .
Substituting the above into Eq. (11) and using the fact that Pta = P ∗ta = Pt(A∗ = a) yields
Et[∆t] ≤
√√√√√√k1/2 ∑
a:Pta>0
PtaEt

(√
Pt(A∗ = a)−
√
Pt(A∗ = a |Xta)
)2
√
Pt(A∗ = a)

≤
√√√√√√k1/2 ∑
a:Pta>0
PtaEt
 ∑
c:P ∗tc>0
(√
Pt(A∗ = c)−
√
Pt(A∗ = c |Xta)
)2
√
Pt(A∗ = c)
 ,
where the second inequality follows by introducing the sum over c. Finally, note that
DF (p, q) =
∑
c:pc 6=qc
(√
pc −√qc
)2
√
qc
.
The result follows from a direct computation using the independence of At and Xt under Pt
(Lemma 26).
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Appendix C. Cops and robbers
To further demonstrate the flexibility of the approach we consider this special case of bandits with
graph feedback. In cops and robbers the learner observes the losses associated with all actions ex-
cept the played action. Except for constant factors, this problem is no harder than the full informa-
tion setting where all losses are observed. Cops and robbers is formalised in the partial monitoring
framework by choosing Σ = [0, 1]k−1, X = [0, 1]k, L(a, x) = xa and
Φ(a, x) = (x1, . . . , xa−1, xa+1, . . . , xk) .
Theorem 17 The minimax regret of cops and robbers satisfies R∗n ≤
√
2n log(k).
This improves on the result by Alon et al. (2015) that R∗n ≤ 5
√
n log(k). We leave for the
future the interesting question of whether or not this method recovers other known results for bandits
with graph feedback. Theorem 17 follows immediately from Theorems 2 and 1, and the following
lemma.
Lemma 18 Thompson sampling for cops and robbers satisfies Et[∆t] ≤
√
2It(A∗; Φt(At), At)
almost surely for all t.
Proof Fix t ∈ [n] and let Gt = arg maxa Pta. Here, we assume that we have already discarded
a suitable set of measure zero, so that we do not need to keep repeating the qualification ‘almost
surely’. Then, subtracting and adding Lt(Gt), expanding the definitions and using that P ∗t = Pt,
Et[∆t] =
∑
a6=Gt
PtaEt[Lt(a)− Lt(Gt)] +
∑
a6=Gt
PtaEt[Lt(Gt)− Lt(a) |A∗ = a]
≤
∑
a6=Gt
Pta
(√
1
2
D
(
Pt,Lt(Gt)|A∗=a
∣∣∣∣Pt,Lt(Gt)))+
√
1
2
D
(
Pt,Lt(a)|A∗=a
∣∣∣∣Pt,Lt(a))
)
≤
√
(A) +
√
(B) ,
where the first inequality follows from grouping the terms that involveLt(Gt) and those that involve
Lt(a) and then using Pinsker’s inequality (1), while the second follows from Cauchy-Schwarz and
the definitions,
(A) =
1− PtGt
2
∑
a6=Gt
Pta D
(
Pt,Lt(Gt)|A∗=a
∣∣∣∣Pt,Lt(Gt)) ,
(B) =
1− PtGt
2
∑
a6=Gt
Pta D
(
Pt,Lt(a)|A∗=a
∣∣∣∣Pt,Lt(a)) .
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The result is completed by bounding each term separately. Using that 1− PtGt =
∑
b 6=Gt Ptb,
(A) =
1− PtGt
2
∑
a6=Gt
Pta D
(
Pt,Lt(Gt)|A∗=a
∣∣∣∣Pt,Lt(Gt))
=
1
2
∑
a6=Gt
Pta
∑
b6=Gt
Ptb D
(
Pt,Lt(Gt)|A∗=a
∣∣∣∣Pt,Lt(Gt))
≤ 1
2
∑
a6=Gt
Pta
∑
b6=Gt
Ptb D
(
Pt,Φt(b)|A∗=a
∣∣∣∣Pt,Φt(b))
≤ 1
2
It(A
∗; Φt(At), At) ,
where the first inequality follows from the data processing inequality (for b 6= Gt, Lt(Gt) is a
deterministic function of Φt(b)) and the last from Lemma 26. The second term is bounded in almost
the same way. Here we use the fact that 1− PtGt ≤ 1− Pta for all a ∈ [k]:
(B) =
1− PtGt
2
∑
a6=Gt
Pta D
(
Pt,Lt(a)|A∗=a
∣∣∣∣Pt,Lt(a))
≤ 1
2
∑
a6=Gt
(1− Pta)Pta D
(
Pt,Lt(a)|A∗=a
∣∣∣∣Pt,Lt(a))
=
1
2
∑
a6=Gt
Pta
∑
b 6=a
Ptb D
(
Pt,Lt(a)|A∗=a
∣∣∣∣Pt,Lt(a))
≤ 1
2
∑
a6=Gt
Pta
∑
b 6=a
Ptb D
(
Pt,Φt(b)|A∗=a
∣∣∣∣Pt,Φt(b))
≤ 1
2
It(A
∗; Φt(At), At) .
Combining the previous displays and rearranging completes the proof.
Appendix D. Proof of Theorem 11
We need the following lemma, which characterises actions c ∈ Nab as having loss vectors `c that
are convex combinations of `a and `b.
Lemma 19 (Barto´k et al. 2014) For all actions c ∈ Nab there exists an α ∈ [0, 1] such that `c =
α`a + (1− α)`b.
Proof [Theorem 11] In order to define the algorithm we first choose a subset C ⊆ [k] such that C
contains no duplicate or degenerate actions and ∪c∈CCc = ∆k−1. We assume additionally that P ∗t
is constant on duplicate actions. Construct the parent function Pt on actions in C in the same way
as Mario sampling. For a 6= b let Tab = (c1, . . . , cm) be an ordering of
{c ∈ ([k] \ C) ∪ {b} : c = b or exists α ∈ (0, 1] with `c = α`a + (1− α)`b}
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ordered by decreasing α values and with cm = b. In other words Tab is a sequence of actions starting
with duplicates of a, then actions c for which `c is a strict convex combination of `a and `b, with
actions that are ‘closer’ to a sorted first. The last element of Tab is b itself. Duplicates of b are not
included in Tab. Let Taa be the duplicates of a, excluding a, in an arbitrary order. Then define
P ′t(c) =

TcP(c)[1] if c ∈ C \ {Gt}
Tcc[1] if c = Gt and Tcc 6= ∅
Tab[i+ 1] if c = Tab[i] .
Let W ′t be the water transfer operator using the tree generated by P ′t instead of Pt and Pt =
(W ′t)kP ∗t . Now we follow the proof of Theorem 10. Let t ∈ [n] be fixed. We start by bound-
ing Et[∆t] in terms of the expected information gain. Given b ∈ C \ {Gt} let fb : NaPt(a) → R be
a function with ∑
c∈NbPt(b)
fb(c,Φt(c)) = Lt(b)− Lt(Pt(b)) ,
which exists by the definition of local observability. By definition we may assume that ‖fb‖∞ ≤ v.
Then
Et[Lt(a)] = Et
Lt(Gt) + ∑
b∈At(a)\{Gt}
∑
c∈NbPt(b)
fb(c,Φt(c))
 .
Therefore
Et[∆t] ≤ v
k∑
a=1
P ∗ta
∑
b∈At(a)\{Gt}
∑
c∈NbPt(b)
√
2 D
(
Pt,Φt(c)|A∗=a
∣∣∣∣Pt,Φt(c))
≤ vk
√√√√√4 k∑
a=1
P ∗ta
∑
b∈At(a)\{Gt}
∑
c∈NbPt(b)
P ∗ta D
(
Pt,Φt(c)|A∗=a
∣∣∣∣Pt,Φt(c))
≤ vk3/2
√√√√√4 k∑
a=1
P ∗ta
∑
b∈At(a)\{Gt}
∑
c∈NbPt(b)
Ptc D
(
Pt,Φt(c)|A∗=a
∣∣∣∣Pt,Φt(c))
≤ vk3/2
√√√√8 k∑
a=1
P ∗ta
k∑
c=1
Ptc D
(
Pt,Φt(c)|A∗=a
∣∣∣∣Pt,Φt(c))
= vk3/2
√
8It(A∗; Φt(At), At) .
And the result follows from Theorem 2 and Theorem 1.
Appendix E. Proof of Theorem 12
Again Thompson sampling does not explore sufficiently often. The most straightforward correction
is to simply add a small amount of forced exploration, which was also used in combination with
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Exp3 in prior analysis of these games (Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2006). We let
Pt = (1− γ)P ∗t + γ1/k , (12)
where ties in the arg max that defines P ∗t are broken by prioritising Pareto optimal actions, which
means that P ∗ta = 0 for all degenerate actions. As usual, the crucial step is to bound the expected
1-step regret in terms of the information gain.
Lemma 20 For the policy playing according to Eq. (12) it holds almost surely that
Et[∆t] ≤ γ + kv
√
2It(A∗; Φt(At), At)
γ
.
Proof Let a◦ be an arbitrary fixed Pareto optimal action and for each Pareto optimal action a let
fa : [k]× Σ→ R be a function with ‖fa‖∞ ≤ v such that
k∑
c=1
fa(c,Φ(c, x)) = L(a, x)− L(a◦, x) for all x ∈ [d] .
The next step is to decompose the expected loss in terms of f :
Et[∆t] =
k∑
a=1
PtaEt[Lt(a)]−
k∑
a=1
P ∗taEt[Lt(a) |A∗ = a]
≤ γ +
k∑
a=1
P ∗ta (Et[Lt(a)]− Et[Lt(a) |A∗ = a])
= γ +
k∑
a=1
P ∗ta (Et[Lt(a)− Lt(a◦)]− Et[Lt(a)− Lt(a◦) |A∗ = a])
= γ +
k∑
a=1
P ∗ta
(
Et
[
k∑
c=1
fa(c,Φt(c))
]
− Et
[
k∑
c=1
fa(c,Φt(c))
∣∣∣∣∣A∗ = a
])
,
where the inequality follows from the definition of Pt and the fact that losses are bounded in [0, 1].
Then, by Pinsker’s inequality (1),
Et[∆t] ≤ γ + v
k∑
c=1
k∑
a=1
P ∗ta
√
2 D
(
Pt,Φt(c)|A∗=a
∣∣∣∣Pt,Φt(c))
≤ γ + v
√√√√2k k∑
a=1
P ∗ta
k∑
c=1
D
(
Pt,Φt(c)|A∗=a
∣∣∣∣Pt,Φt(c))
≤ γ + kv
√√√√2
γ
k∑
a=1
P ∗ta
k∑
c=1
Ptc D
(
Pt,Φt(c)|A∗=a
∣∣∣∣Pt,Φt(c))
= γ + kv
√
2It(A∗; Φt(At), At)
γ
,
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where the first inequality follows from Pinsker’s inequality (1), the second from Cauchy-Schwarz,
the third because 1 ≤ kPtc/γ for all c. The last term follows from Lemma 26.
Proof [Theorem 12] By the previous lemma and Corollary 4,
BRn ≤ nγ + kv
√
2n log(k)
γ
≤ 3(nkv)2/3(log(k)/2)1/3 ,
where we choose γ = n−1/3(kv)2/3(log(k)/2)1/3 and note that when γ > 1 the claim in the
theorem is immediate.
Appendix F. The water transfer operator
Here we explain in more detail the water transfer operator defined by Algorithm 2 and provide the
proof of Lemma 14. An example with k = 6 is illustrated below.
P
WtP
W 2t P
a b c d e = Gt f
Figure 1: Water transfer process
The mugs correspond to actions and are connected at the bottom with valves that default to
being closed. The total volume of water sums to 1. Arrows correspond to edges in the tree. The
dark arrows indicate which valves are open in each iteration and show the direction of flow. In the
first application of Wt, mug c is anomalous and the water in mugs b and c is averaged. Imagine
opening the valve connecting b and c. The water in a is too low to be included in the average. In the
second application, the water in mugs b, c, d and e is averaged. Further applications of Wt have no
effect because there are no anomalous actions.
Remark 21 Another way to think about the application of Wt to P is as follows. First the anoma-
lous action a is identified, if it exists. Then water flows continuously into a from the set of descen-
dants of a that contain more water than a until a is no longer anomalous.
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Proof [Lemma 14] To begin, notice that every application of the water transfer operator reduces
the number of anomalous actions by at least one because: (1) If a is selected by Algorithm 2 then
a is not anomalous in WtP and (2) only actions that were anomalous in P can be anomalous in
WtP . Since there are at most k anomalous actions in any P , the water transfer operator ceases
to have any affect after more than k operations. Hence Qa ≥ maxb∈Dt(a)Qb for all a and the
second part follows. For the first part we show that the loss of WtP is always smaller than P . Let
L¯(b) = Et[Lt(b)] for b ∈ [k] and a ∈ [k] be the anomalous action in P selected by the algorithm.
Then let C = {b ∈ [k] : (WtP )b 6= Pb} be the set of actions for which the distribution is changed.
By the definition of the tree, L¯(b) ≥ L¯(a) for any b ∈ C,
k∑
b=1
(Pb − (WtP )b)L¯(b) = (Pa − (WtP )a)L¯(a) +
∑
b∈C,b 6=a
(Pb − (WtP )b)L¯(b)
=
∑
b∈C,b 6=a
(Pb − (WtP )b)(L¯(b)− L¯(a)) ≥ 0 ,
which shows that Wt decreases the expected loss. For the last part, notice that during each iteration
of the water transfer operator the update occurs by averaging the contents of a number of mugs so
that all have the same level (Fig. 1). Once a group of mugs have been averaged together, subse-
quently they are always averaged together. It follows that after every iteration the actions [k] can
be partitioned so that the level in each partition is the average of Pa. Suppose that a is in partition
S ⊆ [k]. Then Qa = 1|S|
∑
b∈S Pb ≥ Pa/k.
Appendix G. Failure of Thompson sampling for partial monitoring
The following example with k = 3 and d = 2 illustrates the failure of Thompson sampling for
locally observable non-degenerate partial monitoring games. The game is a toy ‘spam filtering’
problem where the learner can either classify an email as spam/not spam or pay a small cost for the
true label. The functions Φ and L are represented by the tables below, with the learner choosing the
rows and adversary the columns.
Losses L NOT SPAM SPAM
SPAM 1 0
NOT SPAM 0 1
UNKNOWN c c
Signals Φ NOT SPAM SPAM
SPAM ⊥ ⊥
NOT SPAM ⊥ ⊥
UNKNOWN NOT SPAM SPAM
Figure 2: The ‘spam’ partial monitoring game. For c < 1/2 the game is locally observable and
non-degenerate. For c = 1/2 the game is locally observable, but degenerate. For c > 1/2
the game is not locally observable, but is globally observable. For c = 0 the game is
trivial.
The learner only elicits meaningful feedback in the spam game by paying a cost of c to observe
the true label. For appropriately chosen c and prior, we will see that Thompson sampling never
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chooses the revealing action, cannot learn, and hence suffers linear regret. Let c > 0 and ν be the
mixture of two Dirac’s: ν = 12δ
n
SPAM +
1
2δ
n
NOT SPAM, where δ
n
i is the Dirac measure on (i, i, . . . , i).
With these choices the optimal action is almost surely either SPAM or NOT SPAM. Since choosing
these actions does not reveal any information, the posterior is equal to the prior and Thompson
sampling plays these two actions uniformly at random. Clearly this leads to linear regret relative
to the optimal policy that plays the exploratory action once to identify the adversary and plays
optimally for the remainder. Since this result holds for any strictly positive cost, it also shows that
Thompson sampling does not work for globally observable games.
Appendix H. Structural lemmas for partial monitoring
Lemma 22 Let a, b ∈ [k] be distinct actions in a non-degenerate game and u ∈ Ca. Then there
exists an action c ∈ Nb\{b} such that 〈`b−`c, u〉 ≥ 0. Furthermore, if u /∈ Cb, then 〈`b−`c, u〉 > 0.
Proof Let w be a point in the relative interior of Cb, which means that 〈`b, w〉 < minc 6=b〈`c, w〉.
Now let c ∈ Nb \ {b} be an action such that v = u + α(w − u) ∈ Cb ∩ Cc for some α ∈ [0, 1),
which exist because Cb is closed convex set and hence {u + α(w − u) : α ∈ R} ∩ Cb, which is
nonempty, must be a closed segment. Let f(x) = 〈`b− `c, u+ x(w− u)〉. By definition, f(α) = 0
and f(1) < 0. Since f is linear it follows that f(0) = 〈`b − `c, u〉 ≥ 0. The second part follows
because if u /∈ Cb, then α > 0, which means that f(0) > f(α) = 0.
w
u
v
Ca
Cb
Cc
w
u
Ca
Cb
Cc
Figure 3: Illustration for the proof of Lemma 22. The bottom left region is Ca and u ∈ Ca so that
a minimises Ex∼u[L(a, x)]. The lemma proves that for the situation in the left figure:
Ex∼u[L(c, x)] < Ex∼u[L(b, x)]. The strict inequality is replaced by an equality if u ∈
Ca ∩ Cb as in the right figure, when u = v.
Lemma 23 Consider a non-degenerate game and let u ∈ ∆k−1 and V = {a : u ∈ Ca} and
E = {(a, b) ∈ V : a and b are neighbours}. Then the graph (V,E) is connected.
Proof This must be a known result about the facet graph of convex polytopes. We give a dimension
argument. You may find Fig. 4 useful. Let Bε(x) = {y ∈ ∆d−1 : ‖y − x‖2 ≤ ε}, Hd be the
d-dimensional Hausdorff measure and ri be the relative interior operator. Since the cells are closed,
there exists an ε > 0 such that Bε(u) ∩ Cc = ∅ for all c /∈ V . Then let a∗(v) = {a ∈ [k] : v ∈ Ca}
be the set of actions that are optimal at v ∈ ∆d−1. It is easy to see that if a∗(v) = {a, b} for
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some v ∈ ∆d−1, then a and b are neighbours. Let N = {v ∈ ∆d−1 : |a∗(v)| > 2}, which
by the assumption that there are no duplicate/degenerate actions has dimension at most d − 3 and
hence Hd−2(N) = 0. Let a, b ∈ V be distinct and v, w ∈ Bε(u) be such that Bδ(v) ⊂ Ca and
Bδ(w) ⊂ Cb for some δ > 0, which by definition means that the interval [v, w] ∩ Cc = ∅ for all
c /∈ V . Let A be the affine space containing v with normal v−w and P = {arg minx∈A ‖x− y‖2 :
y ∈ N} be the projection of N onto A. Since projection onto a plane cannot increase the Hausdorff
measure, Hd−2(P ) = 0. On the other hand, the fact that A ∩ Bδ(v) has dimension d − 2 means
that Hd−2(A ∩ Bδ(v)) > 0. Therefore Hd−2(Bδ(v) ∩ (A \ P )) > 0 and hence there exists an
x ∈ Bδ(v) ∩ A and y = x+ w − v ∈ Bδ(w) such that [x, y] ∩N = ∅. Then the set ∪z∈[x,y]a∗(u)
forms a connected path in V between a and b.
A
x
v
y
w
Bδ(v) Bδ(w)
u
Figure 4: Illustration for the proof of Lemma 23 when d = 3. The whole region shown is a subset
of Bε(u). The set N in this case consists only of u, which has 1-dimensional Hausdorff
measure zero. The cells crossed by the interval [x, y] form the path between a and b in V .
Proof [Lemma 13] By definition there are no edges starting from Gt. By Lemma 22, for all a /∈ Vt
there is a neighbour b ∈ Na with strictly smaller loss, Et[Lt(b)] < Et[Lt(a)]. Hence the definition
of Pt(a) ensures there are no cycles and that every path starting from a /∈ Vt eventually leads to Vt.
Then by Lemma 22 the graph (Vt, Et) is connected, which means that for a ∈ Vt the parent Pt(a)
is a vertex b ∈ Vt that is closest to Gt. Hence all paths lead to Gt.
The next two lemmas bound on the supremum norms of the estimation functions. The first is
restricted to the non-degenerate case where the result was already known and the second holds for
all globally observable games.
Lemma 24 (Lattimore and Szepesva´ri (2019), Lemma 9) For locally observable non-degenerate
games, the function f in Eq. (4) can be chosen so that ‖f‖∞ ≤ d+ 1.
Lemma 25 If (Φ,L) is globally observable, then for each pair of neighbours a and b there exists a
function f satisfying Eq. (4) such that ‖f‖∞ ≤ d1/2(1 + k)d/2. If (Φ,L) is also locally observable,
then f can be chosen so that f(c, σ) = 0 for all c /∈ Nab.
Proof We prove only the first part. The proof for locally observable games is the same, but the signal
matrices defined below are restricted to c ∈ Nab. Assume without loss of generality that Σ = [d]
and d ≥ 2. For c ∈ [k] define Sc ∈ {0, 1}d×d to be the matrix with (Sc)σx = 1 if Φ(c, x) = σ.
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Then let S ∈ {0, 1}d×dk be formed by horizontally stacking the matrices {Sc : c ∈ [k]}. By the
definition of local observability it holds that `a−`b ∈ im(S). Let S+ be the Moore-Penrose pseudo-
inverse of S and let w = S+(`a − `b), which satisfies Sw = `a − `b. Then f can be chosen so that
‖f‖∞ = ‖w‖∞ ≤ ‖w‖2. Since losses are bounded in [0, 1] we have ‖w‖2 ≤ ‖S+‖2 ‖`a − `b‖2 ≤
d1/2σ−1min, where σmin is the smallest nonzero singular value of S. Hence we need to lower bound
the smallest nonzero eigenvalue of B = SS>, which is a d× d matrix with entries in {0, 1, . . . , k}.
The characteristic polynomial of B is χ(λ) = det(λI −B) = ∑di=0 aiλd, where ad = 1 and, up to
a sign, ai is the sum principle minors of B of size d − i. Since the geometric mean is smaller than
the arithmetic mean, for matrix A ∈ [0, k]i×i it holds that det(A) ≤ (tr(A)/i)i ≤ ki. Hence,
|ad−i| ≤
(
d
i
)
ki .
By the binomial theorem,
d∑
i=0
|ai| ≤
d∑
i=0
(
d
i
)
ki = (1 + k)d .
Let imin = min{i : ai 6= 0} and suppose that λ > 0 is the smallest nonzero root of χ, which must
be positive. Then
0 = |χ(λ)| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
d∑
i=imin
aiλ
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = λimin
∣∣∣∣∣∣
d∑
i=imin
aiλ
i−imin
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ λimin
∣∣∣1− (1 + k)dλ∣∣∣ ,
where we used the fact that (ai) are integer-valued. Therefore λ ≥ (1 + k)−d, which means that
‖S+‖2 ≤ (1 + k)d/2 and hence ‖f‖∞ ≤ d1/2(1 + k)d/2.
Appendix I. Figures and examples
Finite partial monitoring example Below is a 4-action finite-outcome, finite-action partial mon-
itoring game with feedback set Σ = {⊥,
曇または晴
にわか雨 雨 雪 大雪 雷
雷雨
,
曇または晴
にわか雨 雨 雪 大雪 雷
雷雨
,
曇または晴
にわか雨 雨 雪 大雪 雷
雷雨
}. The left table shows the loss function and the
right shows the signal function. By staying indoors you cannot evaluate the quality of the snow, but
climbing or skiing in poor conditions is no fun.
LossesL SUN SNOW RAIN
SKI 3/4 0 1
CLIMB 0 3/4 1
MATH 1/2 1/2 1/4
RAINDANCE 1 1 0
SignalsΦ SUN SNOW RAIN
SKI
曇または晴
にわか雨 雨 雪 大雪 雷
雷雨
曇または晴
にわか雨 雨 雪 大雪 雷
雷雨
曇または晴
にわか雨 雨 雪 大雪 雷
雷雨
CLIMB
曇または晴
にわか雨 雨 雪 大雪 雷
雷雨
たは晴
にわか雨 雨 雪 大雪 雷
雷雨
曇または晴
にわか雨 雨 雪 大雪 雷
雷雨
MATH ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
RAINDANCE
曇または晴
にわか雨 雨 雪 大雪 雷
雷雨
曇または晴
にわか雨 雨 雪 大雪 雷
雷雨
曇または晴
にわか雨 雨 雪 大雪 雷
雷雨Figure 5: Example finite partial monitoring game
The following figure shows the cell decomposition for the above game, ∆d−1 is parameterised
by (p, q, 1− p− q). In this game all actions a Pareto optimal. All actions are neighbours of MATH
and otherwise CLIMB and SKI are neighbours and MATH and RAINDANCE. The game is locally
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observable because the loss of all actions can be identified by playing that action, except for MATH,
the losses of which can be identified by playing any of its neighbours.
0 1
1
q
p
CLIMB
SKI
MATH
RAINDANCE
Figure 6: Cell decomposition for the game described above where d = 3. The figure shows ∆d−1
projected onto the plane by the parameterisation (p, q, 1− p− q). All actions are Pareto
optimal, so their cells have dimension d − 1 = 2. The intersection of the cells of neigh-
bouring actions are the lines shared by the cells, which have dimension 1.
Tree construction The figure depicts the cell decomposition for a partial monitoring game with
seven actions and the tree structure defined in Lemma 13. Arrows indicate the parent relationship.
All paths leading towards Gt. Red nodes are descendants of a. Blue nodes are ancestors. Dotted
lines indicate connections in the neighbourhood graph that are not part of the tree.
Gt
a
Figure 7: Tree construction
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Appendix J. Technical calculation
Lemma 26 Let Pta = Pt(At = a). Then the following hold almost surely:
Et[DF (P ∗t+1, P ∗t )] =
k∑
a=1
PtaEt
[
DF (Pt,A∗|Φt(a),Pt,A∗)
]
,
It(A
∗; Φt(At), At) =
k∑
a=1
P ∗ta
k∑
b=1
Ptb Et
[
D
(
Pt,Φt(b)|A∗=a
∣∣∣∣Pt,Φt(b))] .
Proof Recall that P ∗t+1 = Pt+1(A∗ ∈ ·) = Pt(A∗ ∈ · |At,Φt(At)). Then
Et[DF (Pt,A∗|At,Φt(At),Pt,A∗)] = Et
[
Et[DF (Pt,A∗|At,Φt(At),Pt,A∗) |At]
]
= Et
[
Et[DF (Pt,A∗|Φt(At),Pt,A∗) |At]
]
=
k∑
a=1
PtaEt[DF (Pt,A∗|Φt(a),Pt,A∗) |At = a]
=
k∑
a=1
PtaEt[DF (Pt,A∗|Φt(a),Pt,A∗)] ,
where in the second and fourth inequalities we used the independence of At and X under Pt. The
second part of the lemma follows from an identical argument.
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